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Russia is the world’s biggest natural gas producer, with output of 581 bn m
3 in 2001, and is also a 
key supplier of the European gas market (around 30% of current EU gas imports). Therefore gas 
exports rank with oil exports as an essential variable of Russian economic policy, and any 
institutional evolution of its gas export markets is crucial for Russia’s economy as well as its gas 
industry. Liberalisation of the European gas market will have major consequences for main 
suppliers, and therefore for Russia. 
 
I - The liberalisation of the European gas market 
 
1.    The European gas market: some reminders 
 
Gas consumption in the European Union is currently a little over 390 bn m3
 and will grow 
significantly in the future. According to estimates, gas demand of the EU 15 will be 420–650 bn 
m3
 by 2010 and 533–650 bn m3 by 2020 (cf. Table 1). Gas imports, which are currently 200 bn 
m3, will therefore also increase significantly. Imports could rise to about 400 bn m3 in 2020 and 
diversification of traditional suppliers (Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and the UK) is 
likely. We view seven regions as potential long-term gas suppliers to Europe: the North Sea 
(Norway, UK, Denmark), North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya), Russia, the Caspian region 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, cf. Appendix 1), the countries of the Gulf, West Africa 
(Nigeria, Angola), and South America (Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela). 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of some European gas demand scenarios (bn m3)
 
 
   1999    i2010    2020 
OME EU15    386    500    597 
OME EU30    462    642    777 
IEA EU15    386    420-650    533-650 
J Stern EU30      580-690    610-900 
 
Notes:  
EU 15 = Austria, France, Belgium, Greece, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland. 
EU 30 = EU 15 + Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Switzerland. 
Sources: ‘Assessment of Internal and External Gas Supply Options for the EU, Evaluation of the Supply Costs of 
New Natural Gas Supply Projects to the EU and An Investigation of Related Financial Requirements and Tools’, 
Executive Report, OME, 2002. 
Stern (J.).- ‘Traditionalists versus the New Economy: competing agendas for European gas markets over the next 
two decades’, Briefing Paper-Draft, September 5, 2001, Royal International Affairs, London. 
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• The institutional structure of the European gas market 
 
The European gas market was mainly organised around an oligopoly of producer-exporters 
(public companies in Algeria, Norway, Russia and the Netherlands) and a buyers oligopoly, 
including gas companies in European countries, which are in monopoly (or quasi-monopoly) 
positions on their national wholesale markets. This institutional architecture allowed development 
of stable and mature gas supply systems. Relations between the production oligopoly and the 
national import monopolies are structured by long-term contracts of 20-25 years, which share the 
risks. Key elements of this risk sharing are the ‘Take or Pay’ clause, the ‘Final Destination’ 
clause and a clause, by which prices are set by a ‘netback’ relation to oil prices. The British 
market, for a long time separated from the continental market, was gradually liberalised between 
1986 and 1996 and is organised on a competitive basis, with production in the North Sea using a 
system of short contracts (cf. Appendix 2).  
 
In most countries distribution was developed by regional and local authorities in the form of local 
distribution monopolies. But some countries, notably France, the United Kingdom and Spain, 
chose to integrate distribution with gas transport monopolies. 
 
This structure is set to undergo fundamental change due to liberalisation of the gas market, which 
has been prescribed by the EU’s 1998 Gas Directive and will be elaborated by a Directive to be 
voted on in 2003. The latter Directive involves a major institutional evolution, implying 
upheavals in organisation of the European gas market. 
 
2.    The objectives of European gas market liberalisation  
 
Liberalisation of European gas markets aims to create internal and external competition based on 
a competitive unified gas market by integrating traditional and new suppliers (Libya, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Caspian countries), and by development of spot markets around gas ‘hubs’, which are 
being developed. The objective is to secure lower-price supplies for all categories of consumers. 
Less expensive gas will be obtained by eliminating ‘rents’ at all levels of the gas supply chain 
through competitive pressure. Also stability of gas supplies to Europe will be ensured by 
strengthening technical and trade links between national markets, based on their inter-
dependence. 
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3.    Stages of liberalisation of the European gas market 
 
Liberalisation of the European gas market is governed by European Directive 98/30 of June 22, 
1998, which aims to lay minimal bases for deregulation of every national market (cf. Box 1). The 
only such initiative before then had been stage-by-stage liberalisation of the autarkic British 
market, based on North Sea gas (cf. Appendix 2). However, the 1998 Directive, transposed into 
national laws, had only limited effect on competition until 2001 due to preservation of vertical 
integration, prohibitive prices for network access and storage, and insufficient separation between 
gas trading, on the one hand, and transport and storage, on the other hand. Certain countries 
(Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands) chose in 2001 to push ahead with deeper 
liberalisation of their national markets. They even went further than EU recommendations by 
legally separating the transport system, through imposition of rules for access, and by completely 
opening their final market (with possible exception for the domestic market). 
 
The future Directive, principles of which were accepted at the Barcelona Summit (March 16, 
2002), will impose generalisation of these principles to all countries. Germany and France, which 
are the most difficult markets, will have to revise their conditions of access accordingly. This 





Box1: Main elements of the gas Directive of 1998 
 
- The right of access to the network for direct purchases by producers of electricity, eligible 
consumers and distributors. 
- A minimal level of 20% opening in 2000, 28% in 2003 and 33% in 2008 (by reduction of 
threshold consumer eligibility from 25 mn  m
3/year in 2000 to 5 mn  m
3/year in 2008). 
- Conditions of access to the network:  
A - Choice between negotiated or regulated third party access (TPA)  both for transport and 
access to LNG terminals and for distribution (tariffs for regulated access to be published). At the 
end of 2000, a majority of member states had opted in favour of regulated or mixed access. 
B - A price system with three main models: ‘stamp post tariffs’ distance-related tariffs,  and 
‘entry-exit’tariffs. 
C - Transport ancillary services, balancing conditions, storage… 
- An accounting and functional separation of transport activity within gas operators under the 
control of regulators or authorities in charge of competition. 
- Definition of appropriate and effective mechanisms of regulation, control and transparency.  
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Reduction of obstacles to flows between national markets will be encouraged, allowing increase 
of spot exchanges. Market entry will be facilitated. These steps should be based on development 
of new commercial infrastructure, specifically on multilateral exchanges in marketplaces created 
at certain ‘hubs’ (Zeebrugge in Belgium, Baumgarten on the Austrian border, Emdem in North 
Germany where gas pipelines from several sources converge). These hub marketplaces will allow 
development of transactions and gradual establishment of reference prices with liquid markets 
(price discovery) as demonstrated by the English spot market (the ‘National Balancing Point’), 
which concentrates 20% of trade. 
 
These competitive dynamics should influence the current system of vertical relations by long 
term contracts, making it more flexible through negotiation of shorter term contracts in the future 
and renegotiation of certain clauses in existing long-term contracts. 
 
However, the opening of markets will not mean a radical increase in competition over the next 
five years. Constraints on future competitive developments remain strong. Firstly, markets of 
eligible consumers differ widely between countries, particularly as concerns use of gas in 
electricity production, which is significant in certain countries (UK, Italy, Spain) and 
insignificant in other countries (France). Secondly, extension of competition in bulk supply must 
be gradual due to long-term ‘Take or Pay’ contractual commitments. Current contracts leave only 
10% of predicted demand unsatisfied by 2010, offering little scope for new entrants in opening of 
the European gas market. To improve this situation, two countries, Italy and Spain, have required 
a certain amount of long term contracts to be transferred to new entrants at cost price in order to 
encourage development of some competition, following the UK “gas release programme” in 
1994-1995 when British Gas had to give up half of its contracts.   - 6 - 
Box 2: Main features of the future gas Directive 
 
Deepening of national reforms on access to transport and storage 
The future Directive, principles of which were accepted at the Barcelona Summit (March 16, 
2002) will impose two principles on all countries: maximal opening of their end market, legal 
separation of the network, and regulated access. Germany and France, which are the most 
difficult markets, will have to revise their conditions of access in this direction and for France 
openness of its end markets. 
 
- The new Directive will impose accelerated opening of the whole of the end market and increase 
non-discrimination guarantees for access to every gas system. The opening should be complete 
before 2004, with a possible exception for households. This measure will have the largest effect 
on the French market, opening of which was to remain limited to 28% in 2003-2008 and 33% 
after that. A few markets (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden), complete opening of which was 
scheduled only in 2008, may need to accelerate the process. Other countries (Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Austria) have brought forward complete opening of their end market to 2003. 
 
- Improved guarantees of non-discrimination in access to the network and to storage will be 
sought by: 
• obligatory legal separation of the network and storage;  
• regulated third party access;  
• transparency rules on available transport capacities; 
• creation of an independent commission of regulation 
Italy, Spain and Belgium and the Netherlands have anticipated the directive by creating transport 
companies, whose capital is not owned solely by the gas company. 
 
- The directive will require alignment of access conditions to networks for international transport 
of gas, committed by long-term contracts, with ordinary conditions of third-party network access. 
 
- Access to storage capacities will be opened, but subject to negotiation, with a requirement for 
transparency. 
 
Reduction of tariff obstacles to trade 
The new Directive, as well as rules defined together and gradually by regulators and network 
administrators, aims to reduce obstacles to trade. 
- Trade may be hampered by internal modalities of transport tariff setting and by cross-border 
tariffs. The earlier Directive (98/30) imposes no principle for facilitating internal and cross-
border trade. It allows negotiated third party access, which tends to be non-transparent and 
generative of high transaction costs, particularly for short-term, low-volume sales. It also fails to 
define tariff principles, leaving agents free to choose between:  
a - price setting at a distance, point-to-point price setting, or postage stamp price setting (the most 
favourable for trade); 
b - part of the fixed term which reflects the cost of installations in relation to the variable term 
(way of computing past investments, etc.). 
There are also other possibilities for discouraging deals, notably rules of physical balancing of 
deals and of access to the network.   - 7 - 
 
- The Directive establishes no principle for cross-border price setting, although it is desirable to 
avoid accumulation of transit tolls in order to facilitate trade. 
 
- There has been progress in definition of rules for interoperability (adjustment of gas qualities, 
harmonisation of methods for calculating available cross-border capacities) ahead of relative 
convergence of internal and cross-border price setting procedures. 
 
European competition law and long-term contracts 
Existing long-term contracts hamper efficient competition, according to the European 
Commission. The overall character of such contracts is not criticised: ‘Take or Pay’ clauses of 
existing contracts are relatively flexible, and price clauses indexed to oil prices are revisable. But 
the clause of Final Destination for existing and future contracts is controversial because it 
prevents competition between big intermediaries by preventing resale on other markets. Abolition 
of the destination clause is under discussion. But the two exporter countries, which are 
concerned, Algeria and Russia, are strongly opposed to abolition.  
 
 
II - Constraints and opportunities for Russian gas strategy due to liberalisation of the 
European gas market 
 
Russia exported 127 bn m
3 to Europe in 2001, and is thus an essential supplier of the European 
Union (75 bn m
3, cf. Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Russian gas exports to European markets, 1980-2001 (bn m3)
 
 
   1980    1992    1994    1995    1996    1997    1998    1999    2000    2001 
• European Union 22.2    57.2    64.1    68.3    67.9    67.0    70.6    76.9    79.8    75.0 
Germany ( 1 )    11.8    22.9    29.6    32.2    32.3    32.5    32.5    34.9    34.1    32.6 
France    0.0    12.1    12.2    12.5    12.0    10.9    10.9    13.4    12.9    11.2 
Italy    6.4    14.1    13.8    13.9    13.8    14.2    17.3    19.8    21.8   202 
Austria    3.0    5.1    5.1    6.1    6.1    5.6    5.7    5.4    5.1    4.9 
Finland    1.0    3.0    3.4    3.6    3.7    3.6    4.2    4.2    4.3    4.6 
• Turkey    0.0    4.5    4.7    5.7    5.7    6.7    6.6    8.8    10.2    11.1 
• Switzerland    0.0    0.4    0.4    0..4    0.4    0.4    0.3    0.4    0.4    0.3 
Western   22.2    62.1    69.2    74.4    74.4    74.1    78.4    88.4    90.4    86.4 
CEECs    37.1    36.7    42.9    49.1    42.7    42.1    38.4      40.3 
Total    51.6    99.2    105.9    117.3    123.5    116.8    120.5    126.8    129.1    126.7 
 
Liberalisation of the European gas market has certain important consequences for traditional 
suppliers of this market: 
- It will lead eventually to modification of certain contractual clauses of existing contracts 
concerning indexation of prices and multiple aspects of the price formulae, which organise gas 
company sales. Price formulae will have to take account of variations in oil prices more quickly   - 8 - 
(this now takes more than six months). In some cases price formulae will also take account of 
market prices for electricity as an element of valuation of a part of gas supplies, or prices for coal, 
which can substitute gas in electricity production. After several years they may also integrate spot 
market prices on the European continent: these markets do not evolve like oil prices but follow a 
logic of short-term competition (when the markets are sufficiently liquid). Liberalisation will thus 
probably lead to modifications in price formation. In the short and medium term, prices for gas, 
which have not been fixed in contracts, will be pulled downwards due to production 
overcapacities, ‘overcontracting’ in the pre-reform years, and gas-gas competition on short-term 
markets, which will influence redefinition of contractual prices. 
 
- Gas liberalisation may also result in a modification of exported volumes (both volumes that are 
already placed and opportunities for extra sales) by increased flexibility of Take or Pay clauses 
(from 85% to 115 %). 
 
Overall, liberalisation of the EU gas market will probably increase exposure of traditional 
suppliers to ‘price risk’ and ‘volume risk’. It is, however, important to differentiate the short-term 
and long-term stakes, since liberalisation is likely to be gradual. Actual competition will be 
limited in the short run.  
 
• Opportunities due to liberalisation 
 
Liberalisation of the European gas market may help the Russian gas company (Gazprom) to win 
new market shares by offering it new outlets and by allowing it to develop short-term deals (for 
example, on the UK market via the Zeebruge hub). Similarly, Russian oil companies with 
significant natural gas reserves, such as Lukoil, Yukos, and Surgutneftegaz, would be able to 
place sizeable quantities of gas on the European market on a spot or contractual basis. Creation of 
a spot market in Europe will be to these companies’ advantage, if they can export gas.  
 
However, various uncertainties need to be overcome before this strategy can be implemented and 
be financially effective. Firstly, in the short run this strategy can only apply to demand, which is  
not tied down in contracts, and such demand will remain limited during the next 10 years. 
(Implementation of ‘gas-gas’ competition is constrained by long-term contracts, which limit 
scope for spot-based trading). 
 
Secondly, the ability of Russian oil companies to export gas to European markets depends largely 
on global reform of the Russian gas industry. It requires freeing of access to the Gazprom   - 9 - 
transport system and relaxation of the current Gazprom monopoly on gas exports. Uncertainties 
remain about the latter point, since the interests of the Russian state do not necessarily coincide 
with interests of Russian oil companies, which want to export gas.  
 
Thirdly, competitiveness of Gazprom exports and more generally of Russian gas exports will 
determine the ability of Russia to maintain or even increase its market share. Russian 
competitiveness will dependent largely on its cost level compared with those of their other gas 
exporters. Although we lack reliable information on this question, it is reasonable to suspect that 
cost levels of Russian gas deliveries are rising, and that conditions are decidedly less favourable 
than in the past. Significant investments need to be made as current productive assets become 
depreciated (or were already depreciated by Soviet practices of capital replacement). Launch of 
production in zones with more difficult technical conditions will impact costs as the large 
deposits of West Siberia become exhausted. Thanks to their size, Urengoy, Yamburg and 
Medvezhe definitely benefited from very low production costs per well, and this will not 
necessarily be the case for deposits, which come into production in the future. According to J. 
Grace, Yamal development costs will exceed those at Yamburg by a factor of two or three. 
Finally, Russia’s evolution towards a market economy will mean very different cost accounting 
compared to that in the planned economy. Capital and tax costs will be taken into account and 
administrative fixing, which artificially lowered costs under the old system, will no longer apply. 
All these factors may increase production costs.  
 
Also Gazprom currently faces difficulties renewing its production capacities. Russian gas 
reserves are vast, but low domestic prices for gas and non-cash settlement have reduced 
Gazprom’s financial resources, constraining its investment strategy. There are therefore doubts 
about whether Gazprom can exploit its reserves fast enough to allow major increases in export to 
Europe from the current level of 127 bn m
3. Russia’s long-term national energy plan envisages 
gas production of 615-655 bn m
3 by 2010, but the Gazprom CEO, Alexei Miller, is limiting his 
ambitions to stabilisation of production at 530 bn m
3 over the next 10 years.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that a strategy aiming at conquest of new market shares would pull 
spot prices downwards, leading to unease among Gazprom’s major contractual partners. S. 
Boussena, the former Algerian minister for hydrocarbons, took the view that suppliers will have 
to find a balance ‘between defence of their position and conquest of new market shares, on the 
one hand, and between current strategies to maximise volumes and strategies for defending prices 
by restricting volumes in agreement with competitors, on the other hand’. Considering Gazprom 
practices aimed at maximisation of exports, budgetary constraints of the Russian state, domestic   - 10 - 
non-payments and the low domestic gas prices, balancing between a high-volume strategy and a 
strategy of price defence could prove extremely difficult. 
 
• Constraints for the Russian gas industry 
 
In the short term and even more in the longer term, adaptation of contractual clauses (Take or 
Pay, indexation of prices, and Final Destination) are strong constraints for Gazprom since long-
term contracts are the basis of the company’s investment financing in production and transport. 
 
For Gazprom, as for other EU suppliers (such as Algeria), the Take or Pay clause and clause on 
indexation to oil prices grant financial stability, which is definitely necessary for large-scale 
investments. This may be particularly true for Gazprom, since the company suffers major 
financial losses on its domestic market due to non-payments, barter, and low prices. Gazprom is 
thus more dependent than any other gas company on export conditions for financing investments 
and renewing production capacities. In this respect, modification of long-term contracts implies 
major uncertainty and may increase constraints on company investment policy just as major 
investment is needed for launch of new deposits (Yamal, Shtokmanovoskoye). Gazprom has to 
invest massively in renewal of its production base due to progressive exhaustion of its major 
deposits (Urengoy, Yamburg). Opening up to international investors could partially mitigate this 
problem, but such investors will also face increased financial risk if gas prices on the European 
market are low and volatile. 
 
Liberalisation of the European gas market does indeed threaten to induce and maintain low prices 
for gas (cf. Box 3). However, suppliers need to distinguish the short-term and long-term stakes. 
In the short term, this factor will only apply to gas supplies that are not dependent on contracts 
indexed to oil prices (their share is expected to be small during the next 10 years). The effect will 
naturally be much more significant in the long term. In particular, price volatility, which could 
result from liberalisation of the European gas market, is an important constraint and factor of 
uncertainty for the Russian state and its budget, considering the importance of gas exports in  
fiscal revenues. 
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Box 3: Possible evolution of gas prices on the European market 
 
Gas competition in Europe is likely to remain limited through the period of liberalisation 
(roughly over the next 10 years) due to long-term contracts, which have already been signed. 
Such contracts account for all but 10% of expected needs in 2010, according to Eurogas. Contract 
prices will largely remain correlated with oil prices and will fluctuate as a consequence. 
Wholesale gas price development since 1998 has been closely linked to oil prices. Price fixing 
clauses in existing contracts may be renegotiated due to seasonal influence of spot prices 
(summer prices will tend to be lower than long-term contract prices), and due to changes in the 
value of gas on the downstream market as it assumes increasing importance as a feedstock for 
power stations. Prices in long-term contracts may also include a short-term price indexation 
percentage if a reference spot market emerges. 
 
In the medium term, the development of short- and medium-term gas-gas competition could lead 
to a fall in gas prices accompanied by volatility, with spot prices going higher at peak periods 
(winter for example). Such price decline, which would mark a certain independence from the oil 
price, will result from existing overcapacity in production and import contracts compared with 
actual needs of European countries. There are many ways of increasing imports at low cost. 
 
However, the cyclical price variations will remain within a framework set by oil and coal prices, 
since any excessive increase would entail replacement by oil and any excessive lowering would 
put gas in competition with coal. The IEA emphasises that competition due to energy substitution 
remains a key factor in formation of gas prices on competitive markets (the US is an example). 
There are close links between seasonal demand for gas, prices for gas, and prices for oil and coal. 
Finally, prices will also be influenced by evolution of gas supply and demand in Europe, and by 
the structure of suppliers’ production and transport costs. 
 
Finally, one of the current key issues for suppliers to the EU is possible abolition of the final 
destination clause. EU gas market liberalisation presupposes abolition of this clause, in order to 
assure application of European competition rights, since the clause is incompatible with creation 
of a market that involves trade and arbitrage between operators (in both space and time). 
Abolition of the final destination clause would allow gas pipeline companies to use gas bought 
within the framework of long-term contracts to participate in competitive trade between 
countries. However, abolition of this clause is widely opposed by suppliers (mainly Algeria and 
Russia), partly because they want to maintain certain control over their end markets, but mainly 
because they want to prevent initial buyers finding extra value by reselling gas on other markets 
where prices are higher.  
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Appendix I: Summary analysis of the main gas regions of Russia and the Caspian  
 
 
1.    Russia 
 
Russia has proven natural gas reserves of 48 140 bn m
3, the biggest in the world. Russian 
production is extremely concentrated and is currently based on three ‘super-deposits’: Urengoy, 
Yamburg and Medevhze (cf. Table 1). These three main deposits have now reached their 
production plateau, and will sooner or later start to decline, although uncertainties remain on the 
rhythm of this decline. Russian production increases up to 2010 will be based on satellite deposits 
of Medvezhe, Urengoy and Yamburg, and notably by the Zapolarnoye deposit, whose annual 
production could reach 100 bn m
3 by 2005. Also, development of the Shtokmanovoskoye deposit 
in the Barents Sea could give 30 bn m3 annual production from 2006, of 60 bn m
3 from 2015 and 
90 bn m
3 after 2020. Finally, the immense reserves of the Yamal gas province should assure 
growth of Russian gas production from 2010.  
 
Table 1: Production of natural gas in Russia, 1991-2001 (bn  m
3) 
 
   1991    1993    1996    1999    2000    2001 
Russia    642.9    617.6    603.0    590.7    584.2    581.4 
Gazprom    601.6    577.6    564.7    546.6    523.0    512.0 
Nadym-Pur-Taz 
region, of which:  533.3      527.7    510.8    505.0    
Nadymgazprom    68.9    68.0    65.3    72.4    73.6    
Yamburg- 
gazodobycha    166.8    174.0    176.5    175.9    168.0    
Urengoygazprom   282.8    262.8    242.2    209.1    193.3    
Outside Siberia, 
 of which:    63.4    44.0    40.4    -    -    
Orengburg- 
gazprom    48.0    34.5    28.7    24.8    24.2    
Except Gazprom, 
of which:  41.3    40.0    38.3    44.1    61.2    
Itera    -    -    -    6.0    18.0    
Oil holdings          29.5    31.0    
Sources: Gazprom, ITERA group, ‘Gas Matters’ (September 2001) 
 
Russia expects reserve development to allow increase of its gas exports to Europe to around 200 
bn m
3 by 2008 from 130 bn m
3 in 2000.  
 
 
2.    Caspian  
 
Development of hydrocarbon deposits in and around the Caspian Sea and their export to Europe 
depend largely on overcoming transportation difficulties due to awkward geography. The role of 
Russia, with its network of gas pipelines, is an essential part of this.  
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could emerge as important new gas exporters by 2010 
if the problem of export routes can be resolved. 
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- Azerbaijan 
To date, the most important gas deposit in Azerbaijan is Shah Deniz, exploited by a consortium 
led by BP.  
 
- Kazakhstan 
More than 40% of Kazakhstan’s gas reserves are concentrated in the huge Karachaganak deposit. 
Two other deposits worthy of mention are Tengiz and Kashagan. 
 
- Turkmenistan 
Turkmenistan’s main deposits are Dauletaad-Dommez, Shatlyk, Yashlar, and Malay. 
 
 
Table 2: Forecast of natural gas production in the Caspian region (except Russia and Iran), 
       2005-20200 (bn  m
3) 
 
    2005    2010    2015    2020 
 
Azererbaijan   OGJ 2001    9    12    25    29 
   Wood Mackenzie   10    31    38    40 
 
Kazakhstan    OGJ 2001    15    24    37    40 
   Wood Mackenzie   19    35    50    57 
 
Uzbekistan    OGJ 2001    60    68    64    61 
   Wood Mackenzie   57    58    61    64 
 
Turkmenistan    OGJ 2001    44    71    82    93 
   Wood Mackenzie   62    85    108    127 
 
Sources: Smith (R.).- ‘Politics, production levels to determine Caspian area energy export options’, in Oil and Gas 
Journal, May 28, 2001, p. 33-38; McCutcheon (H.).- ‘Risk management, financing availability’, in Oil and Gas 
Journal, July 24, 2000, p. 38-44.   - 14 - 
 
Appendix II: The British experience 
 
We shall summarise the major stages of British gas reform. Introduction of competition in the 
UK was facilitated by existence of about fifteen producers and a significant market. 
 
1st stage, 1982-1993: 
- 1982: Evolution of the regulatory framework with introduction of third-party access to networks 
owned by British Gas (BG).  
- from 1986: major industrial consumers are allowed to buy gas from suppliers other than BG, but 
BG keeps a monopoly of sales less than 25 000 therms per year. 
- 1986: creation of an independent regulatory authority, the Office of Gas (Ofgas), for favouring 
competition. At the same time British Gas is privatised without being dismantled.  
Competition was not able to develop efficiently because British Gas continued to concentrate 
more than 95% of North Sea gas purchases in 1991 thanks to long contracts at guaranteed prices. 
New entries were limited to sales to new electricity producers. 
 
2nd stage, 1994-1999: 
This period is dominated by two major evolutions: continuation of market opening for large 
consumers and preparation for introduction of competition at the level of final consumers, on one 
hand, and changes in BG including separation of its transport and trading activities, on the other 
hand. 
 
- BG was required to reduce its share to 40% of the competitive market by 1995.  
- BG was required to cede an additional 10% of the volume of all its Take or Pay contracts at cost 
price (gas release programmes), then to contract a maximum 90% of new resources placed on the 
market by operators in the British sector of the North Sea. 
 
3rd stage, 1997-2002:  
- Legal and institutional separation of transport activities (henceforth in the hands of Transco) 
and trade activities, with two companies BG plc (the carrier) and Centrica (the seller).  
- Total opening of distribution by 1998. 
- A spot-type market, the ‘National Balancing Point’ (NBP), focused on the Bacton terminal, 
completes the system. The NBP concentrates 20% of physical deals with standard spot contracts. 
- Adoption of a ‘Network Code’, which establishes a series of contractual obligations for those 
who use the Transco network. In particular, a daily balancing market is set up, the ‘On the day 
Commodity Market’ (OCM). 
 
 
In sum, the British system now has the following features: 
- About 15 producers and about 20 suppliers participate on the British market, with Centrica 
having no more than 71% market share. Centrica supplies 12% of demand in industry. 
- There is total ‘unbundling’ of transport, distribution and supply, with: 
- regulated (published) third party access (TPA);  
-  rules of non-discriminatory access, based on the ‘Network Code’ and balancing 
mechanisms. 
-  A significant spot market has been developed. 